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SOCIAL BARRIERS TO PEACE:  





1.1 The optimism generated following the Oslo Peace Accords has gradually been 
replaced by despair following the Palestinians and Israelis inability to reach 
agreement on the core issues including settlements, status of Jerusalem and the 
rights of Palestinian refugees.  Despite subsequent attempts to achieve peace, the 
conflict has deepened, violence is escalating on both sides and over 3,500 people 
have been killed since 2000.  Israel’s intention to disengage from the Palestinians 
is in part a reaction to the current level of conflict.  The construction of what is 
variously called the “separation barrier,” “security fence” or “apartheid wall” 
within the West Bank is a cornerstone of Israel’s latest defence plan.  In a number 
of ways the barrier is symbolic of the wider conflict, emphasising distinctions 
between Israel and the Palestinians, isolating Palestinian communities, adding to 
economic and social deprivation and highlighting the limited impact of the 
international community without American endorsement.  Palestinian grievances 
are being exacerbated by the construction of the barrier and the disengagement 
plan but the central dispute over land has existed since the formation of Israel in 
1948.  Yet the rise in widespread Palestinian active protest and radicalisation is a 




1.2 Explanations for radicalisation of a significant proportion1 of Muslims within the 
occupied territories have tended to follow international accounts for the 
widespread Islamic resurgence.2  This has led to the Palestinian resurgence also 
being considered a consequence of economic crisis’, large-scale unemployment 
and poverty, alienation from modern ways of living, cultural dislocation from 
traditional ways of living due to urban migration and penetration by pervasive 
Western culture.  In addition, Palestinians are seen to have been alienated from 
their social heritage, separated from territory that they see as rightfully theirs (Paz 
2003).  These factors have been instrumental in processes of radicalisation within 
the territories but the analysis overlooks that many of these problems predate the 
resurgence and are not personally experienced by many people who become more 
Islamic or terrorists/freedom fighters (Atran 2004, Hoffman 2003).   
 
1.3 Structural problems are prominent factors within processes of radicalisation but 
we can only explain its contemporary nature and diverse appeal across socio-
economic background and gender by examining the interaction between local and 
international social relations and activities and discursive consciousness.  In other 
words there is a need to identify what has changed within socialisation processes 
and the dialectical interplay between individuals and society that has contributed 
to more people, who instead of adopting secular precepts of previous generations 
are, internalising radical beliefs that challenge both the secular nature of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli occupation.  These beliefs are providing 
a cornerstone for radicals’ identities and a framework for social activities.  
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1.4 There are a number of factors that have brought about changes in levels of 
discursive consciousness that include: the increasing distrust of international 
community, particularly America and disillusionment with the ineffectiveness of 
neighbouring Arab states which have contributed to the gradual realisation that 
independence can only be achieved by the actions of Palestinians (Abdallah 2003, 
Halliday 2002, Saikal 2003).  In addition, there has been growing dissatisfaction 
with secular nationalism, beginning with defeat in the 1967 war led by the 
Egyptian leader and Arab nationalist, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Recently 
dissatisfaction has accelerated due to the considerable problems associated with 
the governing PA including the failure of the peace process, the emergence of the 
intifadas, corruption, human rights’ violations, and an inability to provide many 
Palestinians with basic requirements like employment, housing, transportation, 
security, water, healthcare, electricity and education3. 
 
1.5 As a consequence of these structural and ideological factors the PA’s power and 
influence and the legitimacy of the concept of nationalist secularisation have been 
seriously undermined.  The PA seems unable to impose restraint upon the radical 
movements, even if it wanted to, and there is a danger that the current unrest 
within Gaza will deteriorate into civil war.  These changes have created a power 
vacuum and void within civil society that other movements have been able to 
utilise.  The most influential movement is Hamas4 which was able to connect with 
existing religious sentiment (Abu-Amr 1994, Davis 2003).  This was because 
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religion had remained influential within social habitus, practised even during the 
periods when secular nationalism was prominent.  Religious beliefs, values and 
practices continued to be transmitted from older to younger generations and local 
ulema remained influential within communities.  Generally people were 
internalising moderate and traditional Islam that was influential within individual 
consciousness, local cultural activities and communities (Abu-Amr 1994).  The 
use of Islam did not therefore generally include challenging secularism or the 
Israeli occupation on religious grounds.  However as dissatisfaction and 
ultimately disillusionment has arisen with the peace process, international 
community and secular representatives, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have been able 
to utilise existing religious sentiments and widespread opposition to the 
occupation and attracted popular support because their radical discourse has 
increasingly been legitimised at a number of levels.   
 
1.6 At a military level, radical groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al-Aqsa 
Brigade5 have raised levels of pride among Palestinians through their actions, 
particularly when activists have been willing to die for the cause (discussed in 
more detail shortly).   Radicalisation has also been legitimised by the social 
activities of Hamas in particular.  In Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas have 
established extensive social networks that provide the poor with some of their 
essential requirements, like food, shelter, jobs, security and education.6  This is 
happening at a time when employment prospects are decreasing, real income has 
dropped by an estimated 30 per cent since the Oslo Accord,7 malnourishment 
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amongst children is increasing,8 schools and universities are regularly closed or 
disrupted by army incursions and curfews, students are prevented from attending 
by travel restrictions, wide-scale arbitrary arrests, detentions and imprisonments 
continue, assassinations and civilian deaths are common, houses and the 
infrastructure continue to be destroyed by Israel and land is being confiscated to 
enable the ‘barrier’ to be built.  Consequently there is a real need for welfare 
services.   
 
1.7 Generations of Palestinians have been exposed to similar conditions but crucially 
today many are much more aware of the wider issues and alternatives through 
increased education, Islamic publications and media communications, including 
the advent of satellite television (Sakr 2001) and the development of the virtual 
Palestinian community (Aouragh 2003).  Individuals are being provided with 
information and graphic images about incidents and policies at a much faster rate 
with disturbing representations that contribute to feelings of anger and 
helplessness.  The new media also provides greater opportunities for discussion 
and dissent than was previously available.  Radical Islamic influences can be 
found within the myriad of television and satellite channels, even as Victor (2004) 
observed, in children’s cartoons and music shows which feature stories and songs 
about childhood martyrdom and celebrate the deaths of the martyrs.  And while 
the introduction of the newer methods of communication have been significant, a 
prominent role remains for the more traditional media like newspapers which, as 
Frisch’s (2003) study of the Palestinian media showed, are vehemently opposed to 
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American and Israeli policies and tend to reinforce negative views with little or no 
attempt made to provide balance. 
 
1.8 Education as a socialising agent has also been transformed, with many schools 
and universities penetrated by radical Muslim teachers and student movements to 
increase Islamic influence.  Teachers are transmitting radical views on religion, 
society and Israel, creating meaning and explanation for the situations faced by 
students and representing certain modes of behaviour.  There are also reports of 
the involvement of teachers in the recruitment of potential martyrs amongst 
school children (Victor 2004). At universities, many graduates are leaving 
universities with radical beliefs and good qualifications and skills that prove 
useful for the operations of Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Abu-Amr 1994, Paz 2003).  
Student movements are proving influential in attracting and mobilising support 
amongst their peers in places of higher education like al-Najah University, which 
is considered to be the most radical institution, supplying at least 135 suicide 
bombers during the second intifada (Victor 2004).  Peer groups are also playing a 
much more prominent role and this has coincided with the commensurate decline 
in the influence of parents often found during times of major disruption which 
result in parental values, attitudes and behaviour being undermined by the 
changes (Bandura 1969).  In the territories, peer groups are sharing experiences 
and events that in combination with the media, schools and universities are 
legitimising radical beliefs as individuals are exposed directly or through 
secondary sources to humiliation, often of their parents and wider family 
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members, brutality and wanton destruction by Israeli forces allied to the factors 
often given to explain Islamic radicalisation like unemployment, poverty and 
malnutrition.  Saleh’s (2003) study of the backgrounds of Palestinian bombers 
highlighted both the importance of these factors and the significance of family 
members or friends who had already committed such acts.  
 
1.9 These experiences are leading to growing frustration, anger and awareness that 
secular ideologies and neighbouring and Western nation-states and international 
institutions have been unable to improve the Palestinians position.  The failure of 
the international community, weaknesses within secular nationalism and 
continuing Israeli stronghold has led to a growth in Muslims adhering to a more 
extreme religious discourse.  In many instances this is interpreted to mean 
undertaking the word of Allah through activities aimed at regaining pride and land 
for the Palestinians and thus intertwining nationalism and religion.  These 
interpretations have been supported by numerous fatwas, including most 
controversially, theological justification for activists deliberately killing 
themselves9 in attacking Israelis. 
 
1.10 These multi-layered factors have contributed both to the contemporary 
radicalisation and at the extreme of this process, the emergence of terrorism that 
is, as Halliday (2000:83) observed, “born of desperation, not in the sense that 
people are necessarily destitute or desperate, although some of them certainly are, 
but in the sense that all other means are apparently exhausted” or, I would add, 
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discredited.  The failure of other political means and lack of viable opportunities 
for meaningful participation within democratic processes has led to desperation 
which contributes to individuals’ consciously internalising radical discourse and 
in some instances the decision to become martyrs. A point acknowledged by the 
late political head of Hamas, Abdul Aziz Rantisi, when expressing his view that 
“to die in this way [bombing Israelis] is better than to die daily in frustration and 
humiliation.”10  
 
1.11 Worryingly for the long-term prospects for peace, children have already been 
socialised into this way of thinking.  Giacaman (2002) has remarked upon how 
Palestinian children who are living in the midst of warfare are, like young adults, 
also being motivated to acts of violence through desperation, living in constant 
fear and “feeling totally helpless and incapacitated.”11  And like older siblings and 
young adults, children are familiar with martyrdom and fantasize within peer 
groups over their deaths, waiting for the time when the fantasies become reality 
(Reuter 2004).  The play of young children is now glorifying the attacks, as 
Salman Salameh, one of the mother’s of a male bomber within Victor’s (2004: 
190) study of predominantly female bombers, remarked “All the children say they 
want to be martyrs…They play intifada” as part of socialising processes where as 
the Palestinian Iyad Sarraj noted, “our children are being taught in the mosques, 
on television, and in schools to die.”12 
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1.12 For some Palestinians the desperation of public life is compounded by personal 
lives.  Victor’s (2004) analysis also highlights the significance of both the broad 
Palestinian experiences and those experienced by individuals that contribute 
towards a conscious decision regarding the extent of their involvement in the 
independence struggle.  In her study, Victor outlines the ways in which socio- 
economic conditions, Palestinian society and personal experiences combine to 
create situations where people chose to become martyrs.  For instance, the first 
female martyr, Wafa Idris, shared many of the common Palestinian experiences 
like economic hardship, humiliation and the arrest of brothers but also faced 
personal desperation based upon her sterility and subsequent divorce. As her 
mother Mabrook Idrus, remarked, “she was young, intelligent, and beautiful, and 
had nothing to live for.” 13   Many Palestinians are being socialised through 
communication and experiences into “the abandonment of hope” (Reuter 2004: 
84), dominated by social contexts and power relations, and where radical actions 
are seen as the only way to exert some control over their destiny.  However while 
many Palestinians are seeking to become martyrs as a consequence of 
desperation, they are also undertaking the actions for both egotistical and altruistic 
reasons. 
 
1.13 Acts of Palestinian martyrdom are also motivated by the needs of the community 
and the concept of nation.  As Reuter (2004) commented, highly effective attacks 
by martyrs are showing that the struggle is of greater importance than individual 
lives or looking at it from the other side of the coin, the martyrs have relatively 
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low levels of individualism and are dominated by social goals (Saghieh 2002). In 
other words individuals are internalising radical discourse that stresses the 
importance of the wider entity over the individual.  This is reflected within 
discursive consciousness and the willingness to sacrifice life for the common 
good, even though the fractures with the independence struggle shows that there 
is no universal agreement about what that constitutes nor how it can be achieved.  
For the individual, they take on some control over their destinies and egotistically 
many martyrs are under the impression that undertaking the actions will lead to 
salvation (Davis 2003, Reuter 2004, Vertigans 2003). And by dying for the 
Palestinian cause, potential bombers are aware of reactions to acts of martyrdom 
and the ways that they would be considered within the territories and beyond if 
they became martyrs.  This is because the acts are celebrated within the territories 
as Um Iyad, the mother of the martyr Izzidene, outlined when discussing how she 
found out about her son’s death, “I heard screams from inside the house and the 
next thing I knew people were all over me.  My cousins and my sister and my 
daughters-in-law and everybody just sort of enveloped me with screams and hugs 
and cheers.”15 And as Reuter (2004) noted, parents are regularly seen on 
television proudly accepting the congratulation of family and friends on the 
honour of being a parent of someone who had died to help the fight for 
independence16.  As more people become martyrs and revered, celebrated with 
their images plastered across the territories, and their pictures replacing secular 
heroes on childrens’ bedroom walls, the more attractive it can seem to other 
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individuals to become a martyr and be remembered posthumously as a Palestinian 
hero/heroine (Davis 2003, Reuter 2004, Victor 2004). 
 
1.14 In conclusion, changes in socialisation and interrelated matrices of social 
activities are leading to more Palestinians finding out about radical discourse that 
is communicated by a variety of influential socialising agents across all levels of 
society.  The discourse provides explanations and a sense of meaning in 
conditions that allow only limited opportunities for change.  These conditions, 
experiences and increased awareness of wider issues are legitimising radical 
discourse that is seen to be offering long-term solutions to problems for 
individuals through radicalisation, martyrdom and ultimately salvation.  And 
crucially, these acts are also considered to benefit society, and in particular the 
fight for independence and as such are causes for celebration.  Identity formations 
have been transformed through changes in social relations and activities that has 
resulted in self images developing that are more closely intertwined with national 
and religious consciousness.  Palestinians are increasingly becoming aware of the 
possible impact of radical activities upon peoples’ perceptions of them as 
individuals and in turn this is contributing to their discursive consciousness and 
concomitant adoption of radical beliefs and behaviour.  As more people 
internalise radical discourse, in legitimising conditions, the harder it will be to 
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